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What is a thing? Is this something that contains and discloses truth about our 
environment, or rather truth about us, observers? 
“An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us 
understand its inadequacy”
12. It seemed to be a somewhat unclear but significant 
statement. Does it still? 
I’m not sure I have a general answer to the question about what a thing is.  It seems to 
me that there are many different kinds of things, and there can be a different answer 
for each of them.  I have written mostly about a specific variety of things, what Gibson 
called ‘affordances’.  Affordances are the entities that animals perceive and act upon.  
I agree with Gibson that affordances cut across the subjective-objective distinction, 
and also that they cut across the mental-physical distinction.  This is because affor-
dances are intelligible only in terms of both the abilities of animals, including percep-
tual abilities, and the features of the environment.  So, they really are both mental and 
physical.  So, as you put it, the theory of affordances discloses truths about both ob-
servers and environments.  The theory of affordances, I also believe, fails to disclose 
truths about either observers or environments separately.  Gibson (and later Gibso-
nian  psychologists)  have  put  this  by  saying  that  psychology  studies  animal-
environment systems.   
What about other sorts of things?  I should point out here that the conception of affor-
dances is (non-viciously) circular.  Affordances are only intelligible in terms of abili-
ties, and vice versa.  So abilities also cut across this subjective-objective dichotomy.  
One could also define all sorts of other things in terms of affordances, thereby making 
affordances some sort of ontological primitive.  Doing so would make every kind of 
thing disclosing of truths about both observers and environments.  I have, for exam-
ple, written about defining perceivable events in terms of affordances. Beyond that, 
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however, I’m not sure that generalizing from the funny subjective-objective character 
of affordances is a good idea.  That is, I doubt that everything is both subjective and 
objective like affordances are.   
Certainly, it was not Gibson’s intention to claim that everything was an affordance.  
Rather, he wanted to argue that affordances existed in the environment along with the 
trees and monkeys.  That is the sense in which Gibson was a realist.  The things we 
perceive are not constructed in our heads, and projected onto the world; instead, the 
things we perceive exist in the world.  I feel confident that he was right about this. 
 
For the short answer: Why is Gibsonian theory the best theory of the nature of 
animal environment systems for radical embodied cognitive science? 
Philosopher  Martin  Heidegger  in  your  account  seems  to  be  very…  ecological-
psychology-hungry. (“Heidegger in the Lab: When tools break down” – an excel-
lent title!) What has inspired you in his work most of all? 
I got very interested in Gibson via reading phenomenology, really.  I happened to be 
reading both Merleau-Ponty’s The Phenomenology of Perception and Gibson’s The Eco-
logical Approach to Visual Perception at the same time while I was in grad school.  I 
was struck by the similarities.  Prior to that, I had been hanging around Tim van Geld-
er, and reading lots of Heidegger, along with lots of robotics and dynamical modeling.  
The set of ideas that I eventually started calling ‘radical embodied cognitive science’ 
(that name is stolen from Andy Clark, by the way) started there.  When I read Gibson, I 
thought that he had outlined the way that phenomenologists should do scientific psy-
chology. Reading work by later Gibsonians, especially Mike Turvey and Bill Warren, 
only made me more convinced of this.  Radical embodied cognitive science is, in large 
part, a philosophy of science for the science that folks like Turvey and Warren do.   
That was a genealogical answer to a conceptual question.  So here is the conceptual 
answer, which I wrote about in one of my first publications.  When people talk about 
mental representation, they typically have in mind an organism confronting a inde-
pendent,  structured  environment,  and  the  organism  having  some  structures  on  its 
inside that stand in for the structures of the environment.  So, if you want to be an 
anti-representationalist, you can say that there is nothing on the inside of the organ-
ism that is the right sort of structure.  Alternatively, you could say that the environ-
mental structures are not independent of the organism in the right way.  It seemed to 
me that the Gibson was making both of these claims: representations inside of organ-
isms are the wrong way to understand perception, and that the things that organisms 
perceive are not fully independent of the organisms themselves.  Furthermore, Gib-
son’s ideas—unlike Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s—have already been the engine 
for lots of scientific discovery. 
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To what extent have you retired from Gibson? 
Over the last several years, Rob Withagen and I
13 have been developing some of Gib-
son’s ideas in ways that most ecological psychologists do not like, precisely because 
they contradict some of the things Gibson wrote.  This gets pretty technical, but the 
main area of disagreement is over what is required for some pattern in light (or vi-
brating air, etc.) to carry information about the environment.  Basically, Gibson and 
later Gibsonians (especially, Mike Turvey, Bill Mace, and Bob Shaw) argued that in 
order to carry information, a pattern in light (etc.) has to be 1:1 correlated with a par-
ticular environmental event.  Rob and I think this is far too strict, and that we guide 
our behavior by lots of patterns in light (etc.) that are only probabilistically related to 
environmental events.  Here’s an example.  Suppose you are in your office with the 
light on.  I could, from outside the building, see that your light is on (a particular pat-
tern) and guide my behavior as if you are in your office.  We would say that the light 
being on carries information about your presence in your office. But, sometimes your 
office light is on when you are not, in fact, in your office.  Gibson (and later Gibso-
nians) would say that the possibility that you are not in your office when the light is on 
means that the light being on can never carry information that you are in your office.  
Rob and I disagree. 
This molehill can be made into a mountain, because it implies different conceptions of 
affordances and direct perception, which Rob and I have also developed.  In doing so, 
though, we don’t think of ourselves as abandoning Gibson’s ideas, but as fine-tuning 
them.  Many Gibsonians think we are abandoning Gibson. 
 
There are many definitions of emergence and self-organization. Both phenomena 
are connected especially in ecological approach. Furthermore, it is not so clear 
what lower(micro) level and higher(global) level are. How do you understand it? 
I typically try very hard not to use the ‘E-word’ because it has so many connotations, 
and is taken by some people to signal fuzzy headedness.  I have, however, tried to say 
in some detail what self-organization is
14, mostly in work collaborating with Mike Tur-
vey. Before I talk about that, I should say something about why ecological psycholo-
gists care so much about self-organization, because it’s not necessarily obvious why 
they would.  In the ecological approach, perception of the world is not a matter of add-
ing information to sensory representations; instead it is a matter of keeping in touch 
with the environment.  Because perception doesn’t end with representations of the 
environment, action cannot come from developing plans by manipulating representa-
tions.  So the ecological approach requires an understanding of action that doesn’t 
require plans.  As Gibson put it, action needs to be regular without being regulated.  
There is no internal agency doing the driving.  Scott Kelso, Peter Kugler, and Mike 
Turvey realized that a good way to think about action as regular but not regulated is to 
                                                             
13 (Withagen & Chemero 2009, 2012) 
14 (Chemero 2008) AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
 
21
think of it as self-organizing.  That was more than 30 years ago, and there is now lots 
and lots of evidence that they were right. 
OK, now to the actual questions being asked: what is the right way to understand self-
organization, and how should one understand the relation between levels?  Unfortu-
nately, there are lots of names for self-organization, even though they all point to the 
same basic phenomenon, and most descriptions of that phenomenon are highly tech-
nical and/or mathematical.  The basic idea is pretty simple, though.  You can see self-
organization every time you flush your toilet, in the whirlpool that forms as the water 
flows out.  This whirlpool is a self-organizing pattern of activity.  It is made up of a 
constantly changing collection of water molecules.  When the water molecules are in 
the whirlpool, their activity is constrained by their being in the whirlpool.  Although 
whirlpools and other instances of self-organization are ubiquitous in nature, they look 
very strange from the point of view of physicalism and mechanism.  The whirlpool is 
not identical to any collection of water molecules, but it is not something in addition to 
the water molecules.  The whirlpool, which is made up of water molecules, changes 
the behavior of the water molecules.  So, if we want to put this in terms of levels, we 
have a macro-level whirlpool shaping the behavior of the micro-level molecules that 
make it—the macro-level whirlpool—up. Notice that this is a pretty dramatic depar-
ture from the ways philosophers of mind and philosophers of science typically discuss 
levels,  in  that  the macro-levels  cannot  supervene  on  the  micro-levels  because  they 
causally interact with them. That is, we have “downward causation” in exactly the 
sense that is supposedly impossible according to mechanism and physicalism.  Michael 
Silberstein
15, a frequent collaborator, often puts this by saying that physicalism isn’t 
even true in physics.  And Michael and I
16 have been writing a lot about consciousness 
in terms of the sort of micro-macro relations we see in self-organizing systems.  (See 
below.)   
 
The  theory  of  self-organization  and  emergence  is  important  in  ecological  psy-
chology because some of its important aspects like affordances are described in 
terms originating from those theories. It is said that affordances are emergent 
results  of  self-organized  interaction  between  agent  and  environment.  It  also 
means that behaviour is such an emergent property. In many studies scientist are 
looking on how certain behaviours like grasping or walking emerge. One object 
of such studies may be robots. Do you think that other, more sophisticated beha-
viours  like  moral  actions  will  emerge in  robots  the  same  way  as  walking  and 
grasping? 
I can’t make a good prediction about whether moral behavior will be emergent in ro-
bots.  For now, I must admit, though, that I’m not confident that it will. Mostly, I be-
lieve this because I think that there is too much at stake with the sort of robots that are 
on the horizon (i.e., military robots) to allow ethical rules to be anything but explicitly 
built in by engineers, under guidance from policy makers.   
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My shaky predictions about the future of robot moral behavior do not reflect my views 
about moral behavior in animals.  I believe that moral actions in animals work in ex-
actly the same way as other actions: they are emergent in animal-environment sys-
tems.  A few years ago, I published a paper about this with Eranda Jayawickreme
17, a 
former student who now teaches at Wake Forest University.  Eranda and I argued that 
moral virtues should be understood as a kind of ability to act.  Just as abilities to walk 
and grasp are only intelligible in relation to affordances for walking and grasping, we 
argued that virtues are only intelligible in terms of moral affordances, i.e., opportuni-
ties to act morally.  If this is right, moral action would emerge in animal-environment 
systems in exactly the way that walking and grasping do.  The paper was just a sketch, 
and there is a lot more work to do on it. I haven’t had time, unfortunately, but Eranda 
has carried this a little further.  He’s been using the ideas of virtues as abilities and 
moral affordances to understand heroism.   
 
 “There is no need to posit representations of the environment inside the animal 
(or computations thereupon) because animals and environments are taken, both 
in theory and models, to be coupled”; “Dynamical systems theory can also pro-
vide nonrepresentational explanations of internal brain processes”
18. We have an 
untoward inquiry: To what extent can one talk reasonably about consciousness 
and mind without relating to neuroscience, head, brain in a vat? 
I don’t think we can explain consciousness without neuroscience, and things in the 
head will surely be part of the explanation of consciousness.  But I feel very confident 
that we won’t be able to tell the whole story about consciousness in terms of brains.  
Saying this alone is enough to indicate that I give absolutely no credence to the idea of 
consciousness in a brain in a vat.  First, on the brains in vats, everyone should read the 
paper by Diego Cosmelli and Evan Thompson in the 2011 collection Enaction.  They 
consider in some detail exactly how brains work, and in so doing pretty definitively 
crush the very idea of a brain in a vat.  I won’t spoil their punch line here.  Even more 
strongly, though, than rejecting brains in vats, I reject the idea of neural correlates of 
consciousness.  There are no correlates of consciousness because consciousness, like 
thinking  more  generally,  happens  in  brain-body-environment  systems.    There’s  a 
small discussion of this in my book, and a longer discussion in a recent paper I’ve writ-
ten with Michael Silberstein.  
Claiming that consciousness doesn’t happen in brains alone might strike many people 
reading  this  as  crazy,  even  though  similar  claims  have  also  been  made  by  Evan 
Thompson and Alva Noë.  In today’s brain-centric intellectual climate, the claim is un-
deniably counterintuitive.  But Michael and I argue that the current problem space for 
discussions of consciousness is a dead end, essentially forcing you to be a reductionist 
or a dualist—there really aren’t other stable and convincing positions.  The advantage 
of rejecting the idea of neural correlates of consciousness is that it gets you out of this 
dilemma.  That is, it makes it possible to claim, to adapt a phrase from Ryle, that con-
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sciousness is neither nothing but brain activity, nor is it something else in addition to 
brain activity.  Michael and I argue that consciousness is best understood as the activi-
ty of nonlinearly coupled brain-body-environment systems.  Maybe this is crazy, but at 
least it has the advantage of pushing us out of the current dead end arguments. 
 
Are there any dangers threatening cognitive science? And are there any dangers 
threatening ecological psychology? 
I think that both cognitive science and ecological psychology are chugging along rea-
sonably well at the moment.  To the extent that they are under threat, both are under 
threat from the same source: neuroscientific reductionism.  There is a way of inter-
preting research in neuroscience, quite common among neuroscientists that I have 
met and often reported in the popular press, that takes neuroscience as a replacement 
for psychology.  That is, many neuroscientists think that, eventually, the psychology 
and cognitive science departments will go away.  At the moment, it seems to me that 
this sort of reductionism is winning the public relations battle.  In optimistic moods, I 
think that this is a temporary phase. 
 
When you commented on “Information, Perception, and Action” by Michaels
19, 
you pointed out her misinterpretation of empirical evidences
20. Do you see many 
examples of misinterpretation of empirical studies? 
Let me start by saying that I don’t think that Claire Michaels misinterpreted her evi-
dence in that study. The main thing I did was to suggest an alternative interpretation, 
one which seemed to me to have happier consequences than her interpretation.  
OK, that aside, I would say that there is always selective interpretation of data.  This is 
inevitable. People are bound to design experiments and interpret findings in light of 
their  theoretical  assumptions.    And  sometimes,  those  theoretical  assumptions  will 
make them blind to important causal factors.  I’ve been thinking a lot about this lately, 
actually, inspired by the work of philosophers of science such as Bas van Fraassen and 
Isabelle Peschard.   
Peschard looks at some of the experiments I’ve done with Charles Heyser
21. Charles 
and I think that neuroscientists who use the object exploration methodology to study 
rodents aren’t careful enough about the objects they allow animals to explore.  We 
showed, in a series of experiments, that mice preferentially explore objects that are 
climbable.  We concluded from this that neuroscientists need to take an explicitly em-
bodied approach, and focus not just on neurotransmitters, but on neurotransmitters-
in-brains-in-bodies-in-environments.  Peschard  points  out  that  the  disagreement  is 
really over what is taken to be relevant in explaining the behavior. We are saying that 
features of bodies and the environment are not just causally active in determining 
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behavior, but also that they are relevant in explaining mouse behavior. No neuros-
cientist  who uses the  object  exploration methodology  doubts  that bodies and  envi-
ronments are causally active in mouse behavior; they just didn’t think they are rele-
vant. They could respond to our experiments by admitting that bodies and environ-
ments are relevant, or they could take features of environments as something to be 
controlled for in designing experiments.  That is, a neuroscientist who does not share 
our commitment to an embodied, ecological approach can admit that features of ob-
jects are causally active in determining behavior, but are nonetheless irrelevant in the 
scientific explanation of behavior.     
One more example, very briefly: Another recent set of experiments I’ve been working 
on with students and former students (Dobri Dotov, Lin Nie, Kevin Wojcik) focuses on 
some  claims  derived  from  Heidegger’s  phenomenology.  (Here’s  a  link  to  an  open-
access publication: 
 http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0009433.)  In  our  experi-
ments, the primary thing we measure are the hand-mouse movements of a person 
playing a simple video game. What we are interested in about the hand movements is 
their variability, and nothing about their central tendency (i.e., their average).  That is, 
what we are interested in primarily is exactly what is generally thrown out as noise in 
most other experiments.  From our point of view in these studies, the noise is the pri-
mary piece of data.    
This difference over what is taken to be relevant is probably the biggest difference 
between “paradigms” in cognitive science, and the most important thing that leads to 
differing interpretations of data.  Neuroscientists agree that the body and the envi-
ronment are causally  important  in determining behavior;  they just  doubt  they are 
relevant.  Gibsonians agree that happenings in brains are causally important in de-
termining behavior; they just doubt they are relevant. 
 
“I have not shown that radical embodied cognitive science is the one true story 
about the mind or cognition or even perception-action. No clever philosophical 
argument  can  do  that”
22.  You  promote  the  idea  of explanatory  pluralism.  You 
claim that we can be both situated, embodied cognitive scientists and realists. Do 
you believe in these ideas gaining acceptance in academic circle? 
I have actually been surprised at the resistance to explanatory pluralism.  It seems to 
me to be an acknowledgement of the complexity of nature, along with our limitations 
as investigators.  Ian Hacking puts this really nicely when he says that the world is so 
rich and multifarious that no one story could ever be true of the world as a whole.  I 
would say the same thing about the mind.  No one theory will be able to explain per-
ception, action, reasoning, social interactions, creativity, and so on.  Many people are 
less modest about the theories they believe.  There are two basic reasons for this.  
First, many people believe that it should be the goal of the sciences to eventually have 
unified theories. Second, many people feel that their particular theory of the mind or 
                                                             
22 (Chemero 2009: 208) AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
 
25
explanatory style will be able account for every phenomenon.  These two objections to 
pluralism can both be admirable.  Unification is a worthwhile goal, of course, and 
good explanations should unify apparently disparate phenomena.  It is a good thing as 
well for scientists to attempt to apply their theories to as many phenomena as possible, 
if only to determine their limits.  But these admirable impulses are too often turned 
into pieces of metaphysical or normative dogma.  For example, some mechanist philo-
sophers of science insist that only mechanistic explanation is legitimate.  
As for the embodiment and realism, I’m not sure many people care enough to agree or 
disagree.  One exception, I suppose, is Tom Ziemke
23, who reviewed my book and de-
voted a lot of the discussion to my discussion of realism.  He politely disagreed with 
my conclusions. 
 
It has not been a long time since you published your last book Radical Embodied 
Cognitive Science, but you are a very active researcher. Is there anything that you 
would like to change, add or remove from the book? 
What is the most problematic question for you in your work recently? 
If you had to attack Anthony Chemero’s approach, what would you choose as a 
blind-spot? 
Of course, there are many, many things I wish I’d done differently in my book. There 
are things I should have said differently, and things I wish I had written more about.  
One mistake I made was to focus on Gibson and dynamics too much, and in so doing 
failed to reflect the strength of the influence of phenomenologists on the ideas in the 
book.  I must admit that this was partly strategic: I thought that the ideas in the book 
would strike as being too strange already, and I didn’t want to give mainstream cogni-
tive scientists and philosophers of cognitive science yet another reason to dismiss the 
book without reading.  Colin Klein, another former student, read a draft of the book 
and said something like “All the Gibson and William James is weird enough, but Feye-
rabend? That just goes too far.”  Imagine if I had also added lots of Heidegger and Mer-
leau-Ponty Though it might have scared off some readers, I think that the book would 
have been better if I had allowed more of the phenomenology in.  I make up for this in 
my next book, I guess, which is co-authored with my colleague Stephan Käufer and is 
actually about phenomenology.  Stephan and I argue that the heirs of the phenomeno-
logical tradition that begins with Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty are scientists, 
not philosophers and literary theorists.  In particular, we argue that beginning in the 
1960s the tradition of phenomenology is taken up by several groups of cognitive scien-
tists and neuroscientists: the practitioners of ecological psychology, enactivist cogni-
tive science, neurodynamics, cognitive linguistics, and Heideggerian artificial intelli-
gence  and  robotics.  So  the  legacy  of  phenomenological  philosophy  is  not  post-
modernist literary theory; rather, it is research in the cognitive sciences that attempts 
to explain lived, human experience. 
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The second major thing I think is really wrong with the book is in the discussion of 
dynamics.  There are two main problems with it.  The first is that I had focused too 
much on research closely related to the Haken-Kelso-Bunz (HKB) model.  Focusing so 
much on HKB was rhetorically useful in a lot of ways: it is easy to understand and al-
ready familiar to a lot of readers; it allowed me to make a lot of points about how dy-
namical cognitive science works; and it allowed me to show how dynamical models 
could provide guides to discovery; how it explains both by making predictions con-
cerning  novel  phenomena  and  by unifying  apparently  disparate  psychological and 
neural phenomena; etc.  But… it is hardly the state of the art in dynamical modeling, 
and I wish I had focused more on some newer varieties of dynamical modeling.  The 
second problem is that I underestimated the popularity of the “dynamics doesn’t ex-
plain, it only describes” objection to dynamical modeling.  Much to my surprise, I hear 
that dismissal of dynamical cognitive science and neuroscience all the time.  Had I 
known that anyone still believed that this was an effective objection, I would have ad-
dressed it in the book.  Now that I realize that lots of people, including people I respect 
like Bill Bechtel, believe this objection, I am working with Michael Silberstein on a new 
theory of dynamical explanation.  We’ve just submitted the first of what will be a se-
ries of papers on this. 
 
Preface and beginning of the first chapter of your book was a sort of manifesto 
for our academic association, from which the AVANT journal originated. Were 
you, so to speak, asking for trouble writing this text, or a declaration like this? 
One of the central tenets of my academic worldview is that things are supposed to be 
fun.  It should be fun to write the things you write, and people should enjoy reading 
them.  This is especially true in philosophy, where the stakes are pretty low.  I haven’t 
always succeeded in writing things that are fun to read, but I think that I did succeed 
with several chunks of my book, including the beginning.  I wouldn’t say, exactly, that 
I was asking for trouble, at least not at first.  But when I saw the perplexed way some 
(especially, older) philosophers reacted to talks about this material, I thought it would 
be fun to push it farther.  Let’s not just compare Chomsky and Fodor to Hegel; let’s also 
compare them to intelligent design theorists!   
It is important to realize, though, that Chomsky and Fodor are among my heroes.  I 
sent a copy of my book to Fodor.  He sent me a kind letter, saying he “looked forward 
to reading it with the most profound misgivings.”  The letter is hanging on the wall of 
my office.  
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